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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Patrick Ian Rodriguez appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of four counts of sexual battery of a minor child 16 or 
17 years of age. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Rodriguez sexually battered his stepdaughter, K.S., on several separate 
occasions when K.S. was between the ages of 16 and 17 years old. (Trial Tr., 
p.196, L.15 - p.209, L.5.) The first incident of abuse occurred when K.S. had 
just gotten out of the shower and was walking from the bathroom to her bedroom 
wearing only a towel. (Trial Tr., p.200, L.15 - p.204, L.3.) Rodriguez stopped 
K.S. in the hallway and told her "he wanted to make sure that everything was 
okay" and "wanted to parent [K.S.] in the best way that he knew how to." {Trial 
Tr., p.200, Ls.19-23.) He asked K.S. to open up her towel and, when K.S. 
complied, Rodriguez "visually inspected" and then touched and "fe[lt] around" 
K.S.'s unclothed breasts. (Trial Tr., p.202, L.5 - p.203, L.22.) 
Rodriguez engaged in similar conduct with K.S. on multiple occasions 
during the spring of 2007 and 2008. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.4-17, p.207, L.2 -
p.208, L.5.) During that same timeframe, Rodriguez also touched K.S.'s vagina 
on a number of different occasions while K.S. was wearing only a towel. (Trial 
Tr., p.204, L.18 - p.206, L.15, p.208, L.22 - p.209, L.5.) In doing so, Rodriguez 
again told K.S. that "he wanted to parent [her] in the best way that he knew how 
and wanted to take care of [her]." (Trial Tr., p.204, L.18 - p.205, L.2.) He also 
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said, "he wanted to make sure that everything was okay down there and that 
[K.S.'s] panties were fitting a little too tight." (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.2-5.) Under this 
guise, Rodriguez knelt down and "visually inspect[ed]" K.S.'s unclothed vagina 
and then "touch[ed] the lips" and "open[ed] it up a little bit." (Trial Tr., p.205, L.6 
- p.206, L.6.) 
During a police interview, Rodriguez admitted to having touched K.S.'s 
breasts but claimed he did so only to check for abnormalities, not for any sexual 
purpose. (State's Exhibit 5.) He also admitted to having checked the fit of K.S.'s 
panties while they were on her and claimed that, if he touched K.S.'s vagina, it 
was accidental and for a non-sexual purpose. (State's Exhibit 5.) 
A grand jury indicted Rodriguez on four counts of sexual battery of a 
minor child 16 or 17 years of age. 1 (R., pp.25-28.) Before trial, the state filed a 
Notice of Intent to Use I.RE. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.48-50.) Specifically, the 
state gave notice of its intent to present evidence that on multiple occasions "in 
the last three to four years" Rodriguez asked his wife's friend if he could see her 
breasts, and that on one occasion he asked his wife's step-mother if he could 
see and/or touch her breasts. (R., pp.48-49; see also 3/5/13 Tr., p.20, L.23 -
p.23, L.1, p.27, L.11 - p.30, L.22.) Rodriguez objected to the proposed 
evidence, arguing it was not relevant for any proper purpose and, even if it was, 
its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. (R., pp.67-69; see also 3/5/13 Tr., p.23, L.17 - p.26, L.24.) After a 
1 The grand jury also indicted Rodriguez on one count of sexual abuse of a child 
under the age of 16 years (R., pp.25-26), but the state dismissed that charge 
before trial (3/5/13 Tr., p.4, L.19 - p.5, L.11 ). 
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hearing, the district court ruled the proposed evidence would "come in over 
[Rodriguez's] 404(b) objection" because it was "relevant as to the essential 
element of intent" as it related to the sexual battery charges in this case. (3/5/13 
Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.12.) The court also determined any danger of unfair 
prejudice could be ameliorated by a limiting instruction directing the jury to only 
consider the evidence for its proper purpose. (3/5/13 Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32, 
L.12.) The court thus permitted the state to present the evidence at trial. (3/5/13 
Tr., p.32, Ls.11-12; Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-20, p.286, L.22-p.288, L.17, p.298, L.7 
- p.303, L.19.) Immediately following presentation of the evidence, the court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard evidence 
that on other occasions, the defendant engaged in conduct of a 
sexual nature with two adult women. This evidence is not to be 
considered in order to show that the defendant is a bad character 
or that he has the propensity to engage in such conduct. 
If and to the extent you believe the testimony, you may only 
consider it as it may relate to the defendant's intent in engaging in 
the alleged conduct described in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment 
[i.e., the counts alleging Rodriguez sexually battered K.S. "by 
groping her breast(s)" (R., pp.26-27)]. 
(Trial Tr., p.313, L.21 - p.314, L.7.) 
The jury found Rodriguez guilty as charged of four counts of sexual 
battery. (R., pp.93-94.) Rodriguez moved for a new trial, arguing the court erred 
in admitting the state's 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.206-13; see also Trial Tr., 
pp.566-69.) The trial court denied the motion. (R., pp.298-99; see also Trial Tr., 
p.581, Ls.2-21.) Rodriguez timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.175-83.) 
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ISSUE 
Rodriguez states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that the 
probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Rodriguez failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting the state's I.RE. 404(b) evidence? More specifically, has Rodriguez 
failed to show the district court abused its discretion in determining the probative 
value of the state's I.RE. 404(b) evidence to establish Rodriguez's intent was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice where Rodriguez's 
intent was directly at issue and where the court gave a limiting instruction 
directing the jury to only consider the evidence for its proper purpose? 
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ARGUMENT 
Rodriguez Has Failed To Establish That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Admitting The State's I.RE. 404(b) Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence that, on multiple 
occasions near the time Rodriguez was alleged to have committed the sexual 
batteries in this case, he asked two adult women if he could see and/or touch 
their breasts. (3/5/13 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.32, L.12, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.7; Trial 
Tr., p.10, Ls.6-20, p.286, L.22 - p.288, L.17, p.298, L.7 - p.303, L.19.) On 
appeal, Rodriguez does not challenge the trial court's determination that the 
evidence was relevant to show his intent as it related to the charged crimes; 
rather, he argues only "that the danger of unfair prejudice in admitting the other 
act evidence substantially outweighed its minimal probative value, and as such, 
the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence over his 
objection." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Rodriguez's argument fails. The trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, applied the correct legal 
standards and exercised reason in determining that the probative value of the 
challenged evidence to show Rodriguez's intent was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rodriguez has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's determination that the probative value of evidence of other 
bad acts for a permissible purpose is not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice "is discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it 
is shown to be an abuse of discretion." State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591, 
301 P.3d 242, 249 (2013) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 
273, 283 (2007); State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991)); 
see also I.R.E. 403. When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for 
an abuse of discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the 
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 
921,216 P.3d 1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
C. Rodriguez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Determining The Probative Value Of The State's I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence 
Was Not Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show that he or she committed the 
crime for which he or she stands trial. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1188 (2009). However, such evidence is admissible if (a) it is relevant to 
prove some issue other than the defendant's character (e.g., motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident), 
and (b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed 
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by the probability of unfair prejudice. I.RE. 403, 404(b); State v. Cross, 132 
Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 
P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. 
App. 1989). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the danger 
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 
139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). This weighing process is 
"committed to the judge's sound discretion." State v. Buzzard, 110 Idaho 800, 
802, 718 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Applying the above legal principles, the district court found that evidence 
that Rodriguez asked on more than one occasion to look at or feel the breasts of 
two adult women was "relevant as to the essential element of intent," particularly 
as it related to Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment that charged Rodriguez with 
sexual battery by having groped K.S. 's breasts with the intent to gratify his own 
sexual desire. (3/5/13 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.12, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.5; see 
also Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-16.) Although the court concluded the evidence was 
relevant for this permissible purpose, it "also very well appreciate[d] that even 
though relevant, some evidence may not be admitted if there's substantial 
danger that the relevance of [the] evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." (3/5/13 Tr., p.31, Ls.13-19.) The court thus engaged 
in the I.RE. 403 weighing process and ultimately concluded that, with an 
appropriate limiting instruction, the probative value of the evidence to show 
Rodriguez's sexual intent would not be substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. (3/5/13 Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.12.) Clearly, the court 
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understood its discretion and acted within the bounds of that discretion in 
weighing the potential for unfair prejudice. 
On appeal, Rodriguez does not challenge the district court's determination 
that the evidence in question was relevant to the issue of his intent. He argues, 
however, that "the relevance of the evidence is incredibly minimal" as compared 
to its potentially prejudicial effect and, therefore, "the district court abused its 
discretion when it concluded that the relevance of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.5-8.) In an attempt to support his claim that the probative value of the 
evidence was "incredibly minimal," Rodriguez points to what he perceives to be 
"significant differences" between the uncharged and charged acts. (Appellant's 
brief, p.6.) He also contends it is "common sense" that heterosexual men, such 
as himself, "consider a woman's breasts to be sexual objects" and, therefore, 
evidence that Rodriguez solicited two adult women to show him or let him feel 
their breasts was not particularly probative "to show that his contact with K.S.'s 
breasts was for the purpose of gratifying his sexual desires." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-7.) Neither of Rodriguez's arguments have merit. 
As summarized by the district court, the evidence in question consisted of 
testimony that, "on two or more prior occasions," Rodriguez "asked two different 
unrelated adult women" - his wife's friend and his wife's stepmother - "to expose 
their breasts to him, and on one occasion had asked one of the women to allow 
him to touch her breasts." (Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-11; compare with Trial Tr., p.277, 
L.6 - p.278, L.2, p.283, L.19 - p.288, L.23, p.294, L.1 - p.295, L.6, p.298, L.7 -
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p.303, L.19.) Rodriguez argues these uncharged acts were significantly different 
than the conduct with which he was charged in this case because the uncharged 
incidents of "proposition[ing]" "occurred in residences during social gatherings 
when other people were in the homes," whereas his "touching of K.S.'s breasts 
occurred while they were alone at the family home, and did not involve a similar 
overtly sexual proposition." (Appellant's brief, p.6 (citations to transcript 
omitted}.) Rodriguez misses the point. The two adult women both testified they 
were alone with Rodriguez on the occasions when he asked to see and/or touch 
their breasts. (Trial Tr., p.284, L.22 - p.288, L.17, p.302, L.6 - p.303, L.19.) 
There can be no question - and, indeed, Rodriguez appears to concede - that 
his actions with respect to the two adult women were "overtly sexual." 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) That others were present in the home, but not in the 
same room, when these incidents occurred does not diminish the probative value 
of the evidence to establish whether Rodriguez also acted with sexual intent 
when, near in time to the uncharged incidents, he sought out his then 16- or 17-
year-old stepdaughter when she was alone, asked her to open her towel and felt 
her breasts. 
Rodriguez posits that, because it is "common sense" and "cannot be 
disputed" that he, as a heterosexual male, would be attracted to developed 
female breasts, the evidence that he solicited two adult women to see and/or feel 
their breasts was "only minimally relevant" to show he acted with similar sexual 
intent when he touched K.S.'s breasts. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Rodriguez's 
argument is unavailing because it entirely ignores the fact that Rodriguez 
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expressly disclaimed having touched K.S.'s breast for any sexual purpose. 
During his interview with police, Rodriguez admitted to having touched K.S.'s 
breasts but claimed he did so only to check for abnormalities. (State's Exhibit 5.) 
Because Rodriguez offered a "legitimate" reason for having touched the 
unclothed breasts of his 16- or 17-year-old stepdaughter, his intent was directly 
at issue. Evidence that Rodriguez had, on other occasions near the time of the 
charged incidents, engaged in virtually identical "overtly sexual" conduct with two 
other females not his stepdaughter was more than "minimally relevant" to rebut 
his defense. 
Rodriguez's assessment of the potentially prejudicial effect of the 
challenged evidence is similarly flawed. He argues the evidence was "incredibly 
prejudicial, especially in light of the relationships of the people with whom he 
engaged, or attempted to engage, in such behavior," and that it "raise[d] the 
likelihood that the jury was predisposed to judge [him] more harshly than it would 
have in the absence of the evidence of his bad behavior." (Appellant's brief, 
p.8.) What Rodriguez fails to acknowledge, however, is that the district court 
specifically recognized this potential for unfair prejudice and minimized the risk of 
such prejudice by giving a limiting instruction directing the jury to only consider 
the evidence for its proper purpose. (3/5/13 Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.12; Trial Tr., 
p.313, L.14 - p.314, L.7.) Assuming, as this Court must, that the jury followed 
the court's instruction, see State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690, 273 P.3d 1271, 
1283 (2012), there is no risk that the jury considered the evidence for anything 
other than its proper purpose. Rodriguez has thus failed to show the trial court 
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abused its discretion in concluding that, with an appropriate limiting instruction, 
the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence 
to rebut Rodriguez's claim that he touched K.S.'s breasts for a non-sexual 
purpose. See State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 328 P.3d 539 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(although evidence of other bad acts "carried some risk that the jury would use it 
for an improper purpose," trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that, with a limiting instruction, risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially 
outweigh probative value of evidence for permissible purpose). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Rodriguez guilty of four counts of sexual battery on 
a minor child 16 or 17 years of age. 
DATED this 5th day of December 2014. 
ORI A. FLEMIN, 
Deputy Attorne}-Oeneral 
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